

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1955

Handwritten signature/initials

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
6/26/03

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

Dear Allen:

Enclosed find a draft letter which I am submitting to you in this informal preliminary manner so that you might suggest if you will a re-draft prior to my formal submission of the request.

I trust the present preliminary draft does make clear the nature of the information requested and the reason therefor.

Sincerely yours,

Handwritten signature: Harry

Enclosure

TS-31-D

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103708

PRELIMINARY DRAFT
5-16-55

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

Dear Mr. Dulles:

As an essential element in the studies which the President has directed me to carry out pursuant to NSC Action No. 1328, it is necessary that I have the most authoritative answers that can be given to the following questions:

1. Assuming the agreement of the USSR to the most effective inspection system that we can devise, and assuming the free access by these inspectors to any area within the Soviet Union and their right to use scientific instruments as a part of such inspection, what would be the degree of certainty of the accountability for all USSR nuclear materials production prior to the initiation of the inspection process?
 - a. If it is not completely certain, what would be the percentage of potential error?
 - b. If your answer to the foregoing indicates a margin of unaccountability, what quantity of weapons of kiloton and megaton yields could be fabricated with the amount of material thus unaccounted for:
 - (1) Utilizing the current weapons production knowledge attained by the United States?

(2) Utilizing the current weapons fabrication knowledge known to be in the possession of the USSR?

- c. In your answer to the foregoing, please describe the type of inspection activity that you are assuming in your judgment as being the most effective that could be carried out.
- d. If your answer to the foregoing indicates a considerable range in your estimate, is there any process of further scientific analysis or of inspection field tests which could more accurately and certainly proscribe the answers?

2. Assuming such an inspection service is initiated, from the date of its installation, what, if any, would be the margin of error on the detection of any clandestine production of nuclear weapons material?

- a. Of plutonium.
- b. Of U-235.
- c. Of other nuclear material.
- d. Please describe the weapons significance of the quantity of materials that you have indicated could not be detected, if any.

I am writing a similar letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and assume that the replies will be joint or coordinated, as appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

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